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Trademark Law in the Time of Kulturkampf: The
Poirean Perspective
Kali Murray*
This Article explores what is termed the “Poirean Perspective,” which is an
examination of Professor Marc Poirier’s seminal work in the relationship of
property theory to the formation of social identity. The Poirean Perspective offers
three key insights on the relationship of property and intellectual property law to
conflicts over social identity. First, the Poirean Perspective suggests how
theoretical conceptions of community in property theory need to capture how
different theoretical and practical contingencies impact doctrinal formation in
property law. Second, the Poirean Perspective suggests that legal and social
conflict over property rights in group identity may ripen into Kulturkampf,
given the disruptions in social status such conflicts generate. Finally, the
Poirean Perspective explores how a type of group-identity in trademarks, called
community brands, is likely to lead to Kulturkampf controversies in intellectual
property law. This Article concludes by applying the Poirean Perspective to the
current controversy over racially stigmatized trademarks such as the Washington
Redskins.
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INTRODUCTION
Marc Poirier was a generous man. It was always a relief to see Marc
at an academic conference. Marc would interrupt you with a chuckle
to tell you to sharpen that thesis or huddle with you in a corner to
laugh at all sorts of academic tomfoolery.
Once, Marc came to speak at my invitation at Marquette. This
lecture was intended to be a short one-day visit. It was, however,
February in Milwaukee and so inevitably, it snowed. I, for once, was
delighted by the snow in Milwaukee as this meant that Marc would have
to stay for an additional three days. At leisure, Marc and I conversed
about so many topics: the availability of a decent pho in Milwaukee,
the false boundaries between the academic communities of property
law and intellectual property law, and the futility of faculty politics.
One conversation between Marc and I stands out amongst our many
conversations that week. In this conversation, we spoke about how his
practice of Buddhism grounded him during a long fight with cancer.
This last conversation revealed to me a different Marc, comfortable in
the spiritual practice that provided him with the strength of his last
years.
Indeed, my truest insight into the source of Marc’s generosity
came on the day of his lecture. Somewhat unexpectedly, Marc
requested that I show him our chapel. He then asked for some time
to sit there without sound. My fondest memory of Marc is walking away
as he sat in solitude, still. It is a memory that I return to again and
again as I confront his death and our loss.
This Symposium, albeit in a small way, allows us to celebrate the
lasting generosity of his ideas. Marc was a creative, omnivorous
scholar, who wrote in environmental law, property law, intellectual
property law, critical race theory, and critical gender theory. He
infused this legal scholarship with critical perspectives drawn from
political philosophy, gender and sexual orientation studies, critical
geography, history and sociology, just to name a few. This Symposium
with many different voices is a fine way to celebrate Marc’s legacy, given
his contributions to numerous scholarly fields.
This Article will focus on Marc’s contributions to the fields of
property and intellectual property theory, which I refer to collectively
as the Poirean Perspective. The Poirean Perspective, in sum, contends
the doctrinal formation1 of property and intellectual property law
1

The term “doctrinal formation” refers to two key concepts. First, it refers
specifically to the doctrinal content of an area and its constituent elements, including
constitutional law, statutory law, and common law. Second, it refers to the ways in such
a doctrine is formed, whether through administrative, legislative, judicial, or social
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occurs through a series of historically and contingent dialogues
between a range of actors that implicate deeply held ideological
norms, cultural beliefs, and communicative actions.2
Two normative claims are key to the Poirean Perspective. Initially,
the Poirean Perspective argues that a thick conception of “community”
is necessary when we contemplate the interaction of property doctrine,
institutions, and actors. For Marc, property law was made in, on, and
around the ground, and consequently then, property law and its legal
institutions need to be flexible and agile to be responsive to these
contingent events. A true insight of the Poirean Perspective is that
property law is always reacting to the choices made by actors
confronted by significant moral dilemmas over the best allocation of
limited resources.
Additionally, the Poirean Perspective claims that certain conflicts
in property law are often heightened as these conflicts reflect the
participants’ beliefs in competing moral claims that might be difficult
to resolve in a clear-cut manner. Marc referred to this process as
Kulturkampf3 and his use of Kulturkampf emerged out of the ongoing
legal conflicts that occurred within the last twenty years as to the legal
status associated with sexual orientation. These controversies—which
included whether free-speech claims should be applied to the
discriminatory exclusion of individuals based on sexual orientation
and whether state sanctioned marital relationships should be available
to any individual, regardless of sexual orientation4—provided Marc a
activism. Kali Murray, Constitutional Patent Law: Principles and Institutions, 93 NEB. L.
REV. 901, 911 (2015) (discussing the concept of doctrinal formation within the context
of patent law).
2
Id. at 911.
3
See Marc R. Poirier, Hastening the Kulturkampf: Boy Scouts of America v. Dale
and the Politics of American Masculinity, 12 L. & SEXUALITY: REV. LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL
& TRANSGENDER LEGAL ISSUES 271, 299 (2003) [hereinafter Poirier, Hastening the
Kulturkampf].
4
Id. at 299; see also Marc R. Poirier, Same-Sex Marriage, Identity Processes, and the
Kulturkampf: Why Federalism is Not The Main Event, 17 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 387
(2008) [hereinafter Poirier, Same-Sex Marriage]; Marc R. Poirier, Microperformances of
Identity: Visible Same-Sex Couples and the Marriage Controversy, 15 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS.
& SOC. JUST. 3 (2008) [hereinafter Poirier, Microperformances of Identity]; Marc R.
Poirier, Gender, Place, Discursive Space: Where is Same-Sex Marriage?, 3 FIU L. REV. 307
(2008) [hereinafter Poirier, Gender, Place, Discursive Space]; Marc R. Poirier, The
Cultural Property Claim Within the Same-Sex Marriage Controversy, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER &
L. 343 (2008) [hereinafter Poirier, The Cultural Property Claim]; Marc R. Poirier, Name
Calling: Identifying Stigma and the “Civil Union”/”Marriage” Distinction, 41 CONN. L. REV.
1425 (2009); Marc R. Poirier, Piecemeal and Wholesale Approaches Towards Marriage
Equality in New Jersey: Is Lewis v. Harris A Dead-End or Just A Detour, 59 RUTGERS L. REV.
291 (2006) [hereinafter Poirier, Piecemeal and Wholesale Approaches Towards Marriage
Equality]; Marc R. Poirier, “Whiffs of Federalism” in United States v. Windsor: Power,
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way to explore how both sides used the vocabulary of property law to
articulate profoundly different moral visions of social change in this
area.
Both of these concepts, contingent community and Kulturkampf,
by themselves would be innovative. The concepts, when coupled
together, are powerful. Each allows us to examine why certain conflicts
over property resources can develop into seemingly unresolvable
controversies, while simultaneously suggesting how legal doctrine can
provide tentative methods for solving these seemingly unresolvable
crises. Marc’s primary claim that questions raised by an ongoing
Kulturkampf in our political discourse is salient as we address what
appears to be a nation deeply divided over numerous moral questions,
prompted by questions of shifting status of groups, including the civil
and political rights granted to those individuals on the basis of sexual
orientation and the status of immigrants-citizen in a globalized
economy.
This Article undertakes two tasks. Part I will first review the basic
premises of the Poirean Perspective. Part II will then describe how
Marc applied the Poirean Perspective to a current controversy: the use
of potentially disparaging trademarks under Section 2(a) of the
Lanham Act of 1946,5 which has been implicated in a number of
naming controversies involving racial identities and now is the subject
of a constitutional challenge at the United States Supreme Court.6
Specifically, Part III uses Marc’s insights on what he terms community
brands to emphasize the ways in which these racially stigmatized
trademarks show the interrelationship of property and intellectual
property theory.
From this analysis, the Article concludes with three primary
claims.
First, the Poirean Perspective suggests that a “thick
conception” of community offers a systematic method of analyzing the
doctrinal formation of property and intellectual property law. Second,
the Poirean Perspective offers insight on how Kulturkampf crises
emerge over the emergent group-identity claims to social status
property. Finally, the Article concludes that the Poirean Perspective is
useful in tackling how intellectual property law may address questions
of race and community in trademark law in a more intelligible manner.

Localism, and Kulturkampf, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 935 (2014).
5
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2016).
6
Lee v. Tam, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 30 (No. 15-1293) (writ of certiorari granted).
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I. THE POIREAN PERSPECTIVE IN PROPERTY LAW
In this Part, the Article considers two concepts which, taken
together, can be said to constitute the Poirean Perspective. First, this
section will explore Marc’s “thick” conception of community and its
impact on property theory, with a particular focus on its relationship
to progressive property theory. Community in the Poirean Perspective
serves as the “medium through which any property and/or natural
resources is conceptualized and approached.”7 Community,
consequently, is a “thick” concept in Poirean theory, serving to explain
three interlocking concepts: ideas, frames, and mediums. Community,
for Marc, was an ongoing dialogue between potentially competing
theoretical conceptions of rights.8 This ongoing dialogue over ideas
could be complicated by the fact that different social, cultural and
economic groups could have very different “frames” by which they
could view property resources.9 Managing the dialogue between ideas,
or the conflict over diverse frames, however, could be resolved by use
of communicative mediums—law and other strategies—that could be
used to achieve imperfect, but socially vital outcomes.10
Second, this section will explore Marc’s reliance on a theory of
Kulturkampf to explain how change can occur within the context of
property law. For Marc, Kulturkampf, the “unrestrained political and
cultural combat motivated by moral righteousness[] with the
understanding that something vital for the survival of society is at
stake,”11 offered a compelling normative claim as to why particular
conflicts over property resources such as real property, environmental
goods, intellectual property, and cultural property are subject to
intense political, social, and legal controversy. The innovation of
Marc’s attention is not simply his reliance on Kulturkampf, a concept
explored by other legal theorists. Rather, Marc detailed specific
mechanisms that demonstrate how Kulturkampf is driven by visibility
conflicts over specific places and spaces. In this way, the process of
Kulturkampf impacts property law and its institutions.

7

Poirier, Hastening the Kulturkampf, supra note 3, at 298.
Marc R. Poirier, Property, Environment, Community, 12 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 43, 66
(1997) [hereinafter Poirier, Property, Environment, Community]. This is an early work in
the Poirean Perspective, but it contains the most complete description of the role of
community as a normative concept in Marc’s scholarly works.
9
Id. at 66.
10
Id. at 68.
11
Poirier, Hastening the Kulturkampf, supra note 3, at 299.
8
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A. Community in the Poirean Perspective
Initially, Marc used the term “community” as a vehicle to address
how normative ideas function in property law and theory. For Marc,
property law and theory, in its theoretical dimensions, often devolved
into arguments over two sharply binary “theor[ies] of the particular
rights”12 associated with a given property claim: the claim of the
individual property owner measured against the claim made by the
broader community, a set of claims that could be invoked in different
ways, including “the human values” of the progressive property
movement13 or the “environmental jeremiad” (a key trope of the
environmental law movement that emphasized the overarching
regulatory necessity of protecting the environment in light of its
potential disappearance).14
The Poirean Perspective, however, rejected this rigid binary
between these definitions of property rights. Instead, Marc claimed
that these two formative conceptions were always in a dialogue with
each other within a legal discourse. For instance, discussing the
specific conflict between individual property owners’ claims and
communal claims in environmental law, Marc noted that:
[W]e must also seek to understand how the ideas reflected
in the property encomium and the environmental jeremiad
interact, express, and reproduce themselves in our culture.
Although the property encomium and the environmental
jeremiad often employ static, quasi-Platonic figures of private
ownership and government regulation, in reality they are
dynamic. Students of property law as it is put into practice
will often find a lability, a dialectic, between its individualregarding and social-good oriented modes of operation.15
Property law, according to Marc, can work effectively when it seeks
“the cracks” between these different conceptions of property rights.
Consequently, the Poirean Perspective suggests that it is
important to pay attention to those legal doctrines that attempt to
manage these binary theoretical norms. To develop his thesis, Marc
examined one particular factual scenario: determining what the best
legal approach for addressing those circumstances in which a
12

LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 19
(2003). Laura Underkuffler defines an important dimension of property as the
theoretical dimension. The theoretical dimension of rights “describes the theory of
the particular rights that is used for any particular conception of property.” Id.
13
Gregory Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
743, 743–44 (2008).
14
Poirier, Property, Environment, Community, supra note 8, at 45.
15
Id. at 45.
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landowner is denied entirely the ability to use a portion of his or her
property by a regulation, and whether such denial is a constitutional
taking under the Fifth Amendment.16 For Marc, the two predominant
approaches failed to fully mediate between the competing claims of
the owner and the regulatory actor. Neither the regulatory oriented
approach embodied by the United States Supreme Court (“the
Supreme Court”) in Pennsylvania Central Transportation Company v. City
of New York17 or the individual property oriented approach, embodied
by the United States in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council18 would
have solved the problem.
Penn Central claimed that taking
jurisprudence did not apply at all to different segments of the
property, while Lucas did not resolve exactly how to determine the
economic value of the segmented portions.19 Rather, Marc claimed
that “the test ought to be whether the private property owner on the
one hand and the regulatory agency on the other have acted
reasonably in negotiating the transition in use. Either side can, in the
words of Justice Holmes, go ‘too far.’”20
The Poirean Perspective, thus, seeks a dialogical balance between
binary conceptions of property law. While the aims of the Poirean
Perspective are consistent with the progressive property movement,
which sought to restore what it perceived to be an imbalance between
the claims of the individual property owner and competing communal
demands, it is also surprising in its innovations. First, the Poirean
Perspective grants a surprisingly sympathetic view to the demands of
the individual property owner insofar as it grants such claims equal
weight in the dialogue. Second, the Poirean Perspective suggests that
the law’s task was not to definitely resolve this dialogic tension between
the claims of the individual property owner and competing demands,
but instead to serve to mediate these claims. This claim, of course,
implies that legal institutions themselves could be reformed in
different ways to encourage an ongoing mediation process. For
instance, Marc suggested the legal test which examined the parties’
“reasonable negotiations” within the takings context shifted the
judicial decision-maker’s focus from the competing demands of the
respective parties, to whether the taking process itself was conducted
in an appropriate manner.21
16
17
18
19
20
21

Id. at 76–77.
Id. at 77 (citing Penn. Cent. Trans. Co. v. N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).
Id. (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)).
Id.
Poirier, Property, Environment, Community, supra note 8, at 80.
Id.
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Community has a second meaning in the Poirean Perspective in
addition to its description of the dialogic tension between diverse
ideological norms. In its second meaning, the term “community” for
Marc offered a way to describe how property conflicts over intangible
and tangible resources are “framed” by different cultural conceptions
of property.22 The Poirean Perspective insists that different social,
cultural, and ethnic groups could view property law, in its basic forms,
rules, and institutions, in radically different ways. Specifically, for
example, Marc pointed to how in colonial New England, English
colonists and Native Americans brought very different views to the
appropriate uses of land, with the accompanying negative
consequence that these two different cultural groups failed to
understand each other’s behavior.23
For Marc, recognizing the importance of cultural frames served
two key purposes in the Poirean Perspective. Initially, the existence of
different cultural frames may complicate unitary understandings of a
theory of rights in property law. The Poirean Perspective sees that
different cultural frames may be necessary to interrogate what is
“private property” or “community regulation” in any given
circumstance. How slaves in the southern United States viewed private
property ownership is an interesting example of how the question of
“cultural frames” can aid in the interrogation of the dominant theory
of rights. Although slaves were not able to legally own property within
the formal legal system, historians such as Dylan Penningroth24 have
noted how informal practices permitted slaves to maintain and trade a
range of different properties. Penningroth, for instance, has noted,
“[t]he fact that slaves owned property opens up new perspectives on
American history. It broadens our attention beyond the master-slave
relationship to consider how relations among the slaves might have
shaped what slaves did with their property, how they earned it, and how
they were able to own it.”25 The unsettling paradox of whether slaves
22

The literature on “frames” and their relationship to social relationships is
extensive. See, e.g., Robert Benford & David Snow, Framing Processes and Social
Movements: An Overview and Assessment, 26 ANN. REV. SOCIOL. 611, 614–615 (2000).
Here, I adopt a definition advanced by Dennis Chong who defines a “common frame
of reference” as an interpretation of an issue that has been popularized through
discussion. Dennis Chong, Creating Common Frames of Reference, in POLITICAL PERSUASION
AND ATTITUDE CHANGES 196 (Diana Motz et al. eds., 1996). The definition captures, in
particular, how the Poirean Perspective “cultural frames” mix formal elements of legal
understanding with more informal attitudes towards property acquisition and
ownership.
23
Id. at 67.
24
DYLAN PENNINGROTH, THE CLAIMS OF KINFOLK 78 (2003).
25
Id.
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could be said to “own” property when they had no legal personality
suggests the ways in which understanding the relevant cultural frame
for any given set of circumstances complicates further how we
understand what are the “rights of the property holder” or what is the
relevant “communal” claim.
Additionally, Marc’s initial insight into the importance of distinct
cultural frames in property debates was furthered by his later insistence
on the theoretical importance of Kulturkampf. Kulturkampf posits a
moment in property interactions during which more diffuse cultural
frames have hardened into distinct moral positions. A concrete
example of this process has occurred with the dispute over building a
pipeline through the Standing Rock reservation.26 What may have
begun as a relatively local dispute over whether a company could build
a pipeline on a reservation, has generated conflict because it involves
very different cultural frames as to the appropriate use of the property,
and thus, consequently has hardened into a property conflict that
invokes distinct moral positions.27
Finally, the Poirean Perspective utilizes the term “community” to
describe the ways in which law can perform to mediate the dialogic
tensions posed by the different ideological and cultural tensions posed
in property law. For Marc, law served an important function as a
communicative medium, given its ability to serve as a common
vocabulary within a dynamic environment.28
Throughout his
scholarship, Marc outlined different types of legal frameworks, which
enabled law to serve as a communicative medium. A useful example
of law serving its function of communicative medium is the balanced
negotiations between landowners and communities under the
Endangered Species Act.29
Two themes emerge from this third meaning of community in the
Poirean Perspective. First, the claim that law serves as a communicative
medium bears a close resemblance to noted German philosopher,
Jürgen Habermas’ claim that legal norms can serve a socially
integrative function in reconciling diverse ideological and cultural
names.30 The relationship of the Poirean Perspective to the works of
26

Carla Javier, A Timeline of the Year of Resistance at Standing Rock, FUSION (Dec. 21,
2016), http://fusion.net/story/372387/timeline-nodapl-protests-standing-rock/.
27
Jack Healy, The View from Two Sides of the Standing Rock Front Lines, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/02/us/standing-rock-frontlines.html?_r=0.
28
Poirier, Property, Environment, Community, supra note 8, at 68–69.
29
Id. at 69–70.
30
See generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1996). A
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Jürgen Habermas is an interesting one insofar as Marc’s early
scholarship did not rely on his philosophical framework. His later
scholarship, however, utilized two primary concepts derived from
Habermas: the relationship between the private sphere and the public
sphere in the constitution of social identity, as well as the claim that
discursive spaces are necessary for the emerging visibility of social
minorities.31
Second, the claim that law functions to reconcile the clashing
ideological norms and cultural frames once again emphasizes the
Poirean Perspective’s normative reliance on institutions and rules that
permit flexible, contingent reasoning to resolve conflict. For Marc,
legal rules that can manage to incorporate significant geographical
information as to a property dispute, or how different communities
experience the social change associated with the increased visibility of
same-sex marriage, could be successful in reconciling the strains such
rules may cause within in a given local community.
In such a way, the Poirean Perspective stresses that sympathy over
why a “losing side” in a conflict that disrupts property rules should be
taken seriously in the judicial and legislative arena. Sympathy is an
unusual element of legal theory. For Marc, sympathy, for instance, as
to why a traditionalist may want to assert that same-sex marriage was
disruptive32 to the historical meaning of marriage was as necessary as
any legal solution was created. While this sympathy should, perhaps,
not extend to preventing the suggested change, such sympathy
increased the political legitimacy of any judicial or legislative action
taken in regard to the disruption in property rights at issue.
Ultimately, the Poirean Perspective offers a rich, thick conception
of community that is useful to property theory, generally, and
progressive property theory, specifically. Progressive property theory,
and its ideological commitments, has been interested in interrogating
the idea of “community” to complicate the relationship of the private
property owner to larger social interests, contending that property law
and its institutions should be shaped by an awareness of “the
underlying human values that property serves and the social
relationships it shapes and reflects.”33 The Poirean Perspective of
fundamental insight of Habermasian theory is that law serves as a communicative, a
kind of “transmission belt” that transforms the resemblance of everyday social
interaction into an abstracted binding form. Id. at 278–79. Notably, Marc did not
directly reference Habermas in this instance, but it is clear that Marc in his later works
did rely substantially on Habermasian discourse theory, and so I note his theory.
31
See, e.g., Poirier, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 4, at 402–03.
32
Poirier, The Cultural Property Claim, supra note 4, at 361–68.
33
See generally Alexander et al., supra note 13.
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community is unique, however, in the way that it complicates the
progressive property claim, by focusing on how the contingent acts of
specific actors “on the ground” are necessary for the evolution of
property law.
Specifically, by focusing on contingent motivation behind
individual actions, the Poirean Perspective complicates the relatively
unitary claim of community in progressive property theory, by
exploring certain historical, social, and geographical circumstances.
While other progressive property theorists have been interested in this
as a dimension of property decision-making, the Poirean Perspective
contends that legal reasoning in property law should incorporate
contingency as a key element that shapes legal rules and related
institutions. A focus on contingency necessarily shifts normative
debate as to, for instance, why exclusion is the central motivation for
the construction of property ownership. Accounting for contingency
in property theory, then, leads us not only to, as Carol Rose discusses
it, “mud”34 in our legal rules, but our legal theory as well.
B. Kulturkampf in the Poirean Perspective
The second key element, Kulturkampf, in the Poirean Perspective,
is a further elaboration on the deeply contextual approach in the
Poirean conception of community. Kulturkampf, in its shorthand,
refers to a potentially unresolvable “cultural war” between two
competing perspectives.
The Poirean Perspective introduced two key innovations in the
theory of Kulturkampf. First, the Poirean Perspective linked the
concept of Kulturkampf to debates over the relationship of status of a
type of property category. Second, the Poirean Perspective specifically
outlined diverse mechanisms that prompted the emergence of
Kulturkampf in property disputes. Marc’s innovations in applying the
theory of Kulturkampf to legal conflicts over property resources form a
core element of the Poirean Perspective, and furthers the relevance of
the Poirean Perspective to property theory.
The term Kulturkampf originated as a way to describe cultural
conflict between conservative reaction and liberal politics during the
Bismarck regime in late nineteenth-century Germany.35 Its use,
34

Carol Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 577–78 (1988)
(outlining the distinction between “crystal” rules in property law and “mud” rules in
property law). Mud rules are “fuzzy, ambiguous rules of decision” that take into
account contextual circumstances. Id. at 578.
35
See HELMUT WALSER SMITH, THE CONTINUITIES OF GERMAN HISTORY: NATION,
RELIGION, RACE ALONG THE LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY (2008) (analyzing historical
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however, has moved beyond historical debates to describe a normative
claim that there exists in modern political democracy a clash between
conservative and liberal perspectives on a range of issues, including the
structure of gender roles in the family, the proper use of sexuality in
social relationships, and the role of religion in public life.36
Prominent legal reliance on the term Kulturkampf (and the ironic
inspiration of a key element of the Poirean Perspective) emerged out
of Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissent in Romer v. Evans,37 in which the
Supreme Court invalidated a statute that prohibited governmental
entities from passing non-discrimination laws related to sexual
orientation.. In dissent to a majority opinion, Justice Scalia stated:
The Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite. The
constitutional amendment before us here is not the
manifestation of a “bare . . . desire to harm” homosexuals,
ante, at 1628, but is rather a modest attempt by seemingly
tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores
against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise
those mores through use of the laws.38
Scalia’s invocation of Kulturkampf provided Marc with a rich
vocabulary that could be used to describe the underlying cultural
tensions that animated the ongoing constitutional controversies
associated with sexual orientation, including the relationship of
speech and discrimination laws39 and same-sex marriage.40
This initial descriptive use of Kulturkampf gradually gave way to
debate over Kulturkampf in the twentieth century). Notably, the question of whether
Kulturkampf actually occurred during the Bismarck Era is itself contested. See Margaret
Lavinia Anderson & Kenneth Barkin, The Myth of the Puttkamer Purge and the Reality of
the Kulturkampf: Some Reflections of the Histography of Imperial Germany, 54 J. MOD. HIST.
647–86 (1982).
36
Poirier, Hastening the Kulturkampf, supra note 3, at 297–99. Marc’s treatment
of Kulturkampf appears to rely on two potential theoretical origins. First, Marc
referenced the work of constitutional scholars such as Jay Michealson, Jack Balkin and
William Eskridge in their use of Kulturkampf. See, e.g., Jay Michealson, On Listening to
the Kulturkampf, or How America Overuled Bowers v. Hardwick, Even Though Romers v. Evans
Didn’t, 49 DUKE L.J. 1599 (2001); Jack Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J.
2313 (1997); William Eskridge, Democracy, Kulturkampf and the Apartheid of the Closet, 50
VAND. L. REV. 419 (1997). Second, Marc referenced the literature related to political
science to explore how Kulturkampf was used to describe cultural disagreements in the
United States. Poirier, Hastening the Kulturkampf, supra note 3, at 299. See, e.g., JAMES
DAVIDSON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA (1991).
37
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996).
38
Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Jeffrey Shaman, Justice Scalia and the Art
of the Rhetoric, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 290 (2012) (discussing Justice Scalia’s use of
foreign phrases as a rhetorical device).
39
See generally Poirier, Hastening the Kulturkampf, supra note 3.
40
See generally Poirier, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 4.
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the Poirean Perspective’s addition of an innovative normative
component. Marc’s central innovation in this area was to embed a
theory of Kulturkampf into basic property law and its related theory.
Specifically, Marc modified the theory of Kulturkampf in three key ways:
tying the theory of Kulturkampf to a theory of property law that
emphasized how social status itself can be classified as a type of
property; outlining how specific mechanisms of Kulturkampf are tied to
real and intangible property concepts; and finally, by emphasizing how
certain visible actions serve to heighten moral conflicts over property
resources.
The Poirean Perspective contends that Kulturkampf conflicts may
be heightened if the maintenance of “group identity” intertwined with
a specific property status. For example, Marc contended that a primary
motivation for supporters of traditional marriage was to protect the
status of marriage as a type of property, namely an “intangible sacred
cultural resource.”41 Cultural property is a “specific form of property
that enhances identity, understanding, and appreciation for the
culture that produced the particular property.”42 What if, Marc
posited, we would recognize that for traditional marriage proponents,
the status of marriage is a type of cultural property? If so, in asserting
that the traditional marriage should be limited to heterosexual
couples, traditionalists were simply acting as property owners, asserting
their “right to exclude others” acting so as “to protect sacred objects,
places, and rituals.”43 Acting as property owners in this regard had the
ability “to preserve and perpetuate group identity over time.”44 Marc
concluded that if we understood marriage as a type of property that
reinforced group identity, a corresponding claim of access would
provoke a Kulturkampf because such claims of access would likely
“pollute” the resource of “marital property” itself.45
The Poirean Perspective’s view that Kulturkampf may intensify
where social status is granted a property status is consistent with other
perspectives in critical legal theory that social status can be a type of
property. The Poirean Perspective should be read in light of Cheryl
Harris’s groundbreaking claim in Whiteness as Property, that the racial
category of whiteness enjoys property status, even under the most
limited definition of property, since the law “accorded ‘holders’ of
41

Poirier, The Cultural Property Claim, supra note 4, at 347.
Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of Cultural Property
in the United States, 75 B.U. L. REV. 559, 569 (1995).
43
Poirier, The Cultural Property Claim, supra note 4, at 344.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 364.
42
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whiteness the same privileges and benefits accorded holders of other
types of property,” including “the right to transfer or alienability, the
right to use and enjoyment, and the right to exclude others.”46 Indeed,
scholarship exists that invokes Kulturkampf in disputes over questions
of racial identity. For example, Carla Pratt utilizes Kulturkampf to
explore the experience of the Seminole Tribe in Florida during the
1840s over whether to include black slaves as citizens within its claim
of nationhood.47
The Poirean Perspective, in this aspect, answers the question of
why, which has been haunting a coastal elite shocked at the recent
election of Donald Trump. Marc’s insight is a simple one: counterreaction will be intense if you lose a property right in a group status
that was once enjoyed by one group over another competing group
within a given society.48 Indeed, as Daniel Sharfstein has noted that
social groups may act in violent ways to preserve group-property claims
or property acquired through status.49 Consequently, counter-reaction
should be anticipated when social movements, such as those
advocating for civil and political rights associated with sexual
orientation, advocate for a change in group-identity generates
property claims. For instance, a Kulterkampf crisis was likely in light of
the expansion of the right to marry as heterosexual couples acquired
significant property rights through civil recognition of their marriages,
including property forms, such as joint tenancy by entirety, or
community property forms.
Examining the Poirean Perspective, with its emphasis on
Kulturkampf triggered by sexual orientation, along with this co-existing
scholarship on race, adds to property theory, and as this Article
discusses, supra, intellectual property theory. To begin with, the
Poirean Perspective adds to our perspectives regarding how things
become property, as it tells us that group-identity can acquire certain types
of property rights. Adding status to the litany of things like real
property, intellectual property, and chattel that can be subject to
property claims is important as we consider the scope and function of
property law and institutions. Furthermore, it suggests the ways in
which progressive property theory can be reformed to accommodate

46

Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1731 (1993).
See Carla D. Pratt, Tribal Kulturkampf: The Role of Race Ideology in Constructing
Native American Identity, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1241 (2005).
48
Poirier, The Cultural Property Claim, supra note 4, at 368.
49
See generally Daniel J. Sharfstein, Atrocity, Entitlement, and Personhood in Property,
98 VA. L. REV. 635, 639–40 (2012) (analyzing how claims of property entitlement may
lead to acts of violence).
47
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questions about how social statuses, like race, poverty, gender, and
sexual orientation, impact the doctrinal formation in property law.
In many respects, the Poirean Perspective also points to the
importance of social impact of property re-classification in property
law. In other works,50 I have studied what I have termed the disruptive
origins of property regimes. The disruptive origin of property regimes
theory argues that an important origin of individual rights can occur
when a property regime goes through a radical re-classification of
property interests within a society.51
An example of such a
reclassification is the way in which the 13th Amendment can be seen
as a disruptive moment in American property because this
Amendment reclassified property—slaves—into citizens.52
The
Poirean Perspective adds to this story of the disruptive origins of
property law in its suggestion that significant changes to property are
likely to prompt significant counter-reactions, particularly if those
changes within property regimes are accompanied by a reclassification
of status property. Kulturkampf becomes a shorthand way of capturing
the cyclical nature of reaction and counter-reaction in a period of
significant property reclassification.
If the Poirean Perspective adds to the theory of Kulturkampf by
explaining why intra-group conflict exists over a potentially sacred
group resource, it also deepens the theory of Kulturkampf, by
explaining where and how such conflicts can emerge and impact
property law and its respective institutions. Marc used property theory
to identify the mechanisms of Kulturkampf. The mechanisms of place
and space answer the question of where the politics of Kulturkampf
emerged, and the mechanisms of visibility and naming explain why
Kulturkampf creates such intense emotions in its participation.
The mechanisms of place and space offered Marc a way to
describe how Kulturkampf emerged at specific times within specific
political moments. Place, as defined by Marc, was a physical location
such as “a building, a beach, a mall, a highway, or an entire town.”53
The key quality of place, for Marc, was its “ubiety” or more easily said,
its “whereness.”54 The possibility of ubiety often generates Kulturkampf
50

Kali Murray, Dispossession at the Center of Property Law, 2 SAVANNAH L. REV. 201,
207 (2015).
51
Id.
52
George Rutherglen, State Action, Private Action, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 94
VA. L. REV. 1367, 1382 (2008).
53
Poirier, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 4, at 401.
54
Id. “Ubiety” is “the quality or state of being in a place: such as, the abstract
quality of being in position: whereness.”
Ubiety, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ubiety (last visited Feb. 11, 2017).
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because:
With ubiety come possibilities for proximity and distance,
possibilities for access and exclusion, and—importantly for
an understanding of Kulturkampf—possibilities for the
control of visibility and choices about ways of being less
visible or invisible. Also important is that, in a specific place,
people will encounter their neighbors and the landscape,
whether they want to or not. To one extent or another,
whatever a geographic place contains in public, whatever
occurs in a public place, is inescapably visible to others
present in the place. So that a place is a particularly
important kind of arena for engaging potentially unwilling
others in civic discourse.55
The experience of place was influenced by the scale of conflict.
Scale describes the way in which places themselves could range from
“biggest to small, from worldwide to state-by-state to local to small and
private.”56
We can consider the importance of the ubiety of Kulturkampf on
the intersection of property law and civil rights law in the late
nineteenth century57 by highlighting the ongoing battles over railroad
cars in the growing segregation of the United States. According to
James Cobb,58 first-class railroad cars served as the crucible of limiting
public accommodations because it was a location in which “whites had
little control over their contact with and proximity to blacks.”
Therefore, first-class railcars became the place of Kulturkampf because
“white passengers who objected vociferously and sometimes violently
to sharing the limited confines of the first-class coach with blacks and
black passengers whose numerous protests and lawsuits reflected their
refusal to accept anything less than first-class accommodations after
purchasing a first-class ticket.”59
All of the primary elements that foster a crisis of Kulturkampf
presented themselves in the railcar: the presence of a propertied space
(the privately owned railcar) as well as the disruption caused by the
visible shifts in the social status of one group that prompted counter
reaction. The railroad car, with its jostling of the indignant whites and
defiant blacks in one physical location, stood in some respects, for the
55

Poirier, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 4, at 401.
Id. at 404.
57
See generally Joseph Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private
Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283 (1996) (discussing the battle over public
accommodations law and its relationship to property law and the right to exclude).
58
JAMES COBB, THE BROWN DECISION, JIM CROW, AND SOUTHERN IDENTITY 19 (2005).
59
Id.
56
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moral claims associated with multi-racial democracy after the Civil War.
Equally important, these were conflicts that were both national in
scale, as individuals traveled through different states, and local in scale,
insofar as the laws that addressed these questions could differ from
state to state. The dialogical mechanism of the law could create a
uniform policy, however, because of the differences in the scalar
function of railroad cars.
Space serves as the second “where” mechanism of Kulturkampf.
After defining space “as a field within which humans interact,”60 Marc
identified three different types of space: place/space, aterritorial
space, and discursive space.61 Like place, space operates on a range of
scales, as different types of place/space, aterritorial space, discursive
space can be experienced from “biggest to small, from universal fields
of discourse to fields that encompass only a limited number of
interacting humans to fields that only encompass a few, then two, then
just one person.”62
Place/space is a term Marc used to describe those places that
hosted formalized, interactive rituals, such as a courtroom, which is a
physical place in which a trial is conducted.63 For Marc, including a
definition of place/space encompassed the fact that a physical location
could also serve a spatial role. The term “space” could also capture
those physical locations that served multiple, interactive roles. For
instance, in the morning a classroom could serve as teaching space,
but in the afternoon could serve as a meeting place for a social
organization such as the Boy Scouts.64 Space could capture the fact
that “one space can involve numerous places—the space of the Little
League or the Boy Scouts is wherever the Little League or the Boy
Scouts meet.”65
Beyond its meaning embodied in the place/space distinction, the
term “space” could refer to a non-physical space, what Marc termed
the “aterritorial field of communicative interaction.”66 A common
example of such an aterritorial field of communicative interactions
might be “an Internet dating service as a space without a place, or an
Internet auction.”67 A less common example of an aterritorial field
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

Poirier, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 4, at 402.
Id.
Id. at 404–05.
Id. at 402.
Id.
Id.
Poirier, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 4, at 402.
Id.
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might be a body of individuals that share a set of common religious
beliefs.68 These aterritorial fields of communicative interactions can
pose challenges for the Poirean Perspective insofar as such spaces can
be multi-scalar, since they are simultaneously local, national, and
international.69 The multi-scalar nature of such aterritorial space
scrambles the ways in which Kulturkampf might be experienced. While
different individuals in a religious community may disagree about
whether to expand the church membership, Marc noted that
Kulturkampf conflict may be lessened because exit from the religious
community may be simpler in those situations in which an actual
physical space is at issue.70
Finally, space can refer to what Marc defined as “discursive
space.”71 Drawing on the work of Madhavi Sunder,72 Marc defined
discursive space as a space in which ongoing cultural identities are
formed through active discourse over discourse texts.73 Marc did not
refer to a specific example of discursive space; however, a paradigmatic
example of a discursive space is the cultural community that could be
formed around the publication of a discourse text, such as a book or a
movie.74 These discursive spaces suggest imagined communities
connected through the shared experience of reading a book or
watching a movie.75 The other types of space, place/space, and
aterritorial communicative space, can reinforce these discursive
spaces. A book can be read in a coffeehouse or religious text can be
shared online. Discursive space, however, differs because such space
is organized through the circulation of discourse text, whether in
physical or non-physical space.
Discursive space, for Marc, prompted significant Kulturkampf
conflict for two key reasons.76 First, it permits the formation of
alternative cultural identities outside of the mainstream norm. Marc
directly referenced the pioneering work of Michael Warner in his

68

Poirier, Gender, Place, Discursive Space, supra note 4, at 324.
Id. at 325.
70
Id. at 326.
71
Poirier, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 4, at 402.
72
Id. (discussing Madhavi Sunder, Note, Authorship and Autonomy as Rites of
Exclusion: The Intellectual Propertization of Free Speech in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay-Lesbian
and Bisexual Group of Boston, 49 STAN. L. REV. 143, 144 (1995)).
73
Poirier, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 4, at 402.
74
See MICHAEL WARNER, PUBLICS AND COUNTERPUBLICS 11–12 (2005) (“[T]he
notion of a public enables a reflexivity in the circulation of texts among strangers who
become, by virtue of their reflexively circulating discourse, a social entity.”).
75
Id.
76
Poirier, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 4, at 402.
69
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treatment of the relationship between Kulturkampf and discursive
space. Expanding on the work of Jürgen Habermas,77 Warner
introduced the ideas of “publics and counterpublics” into discussion
of discursive space, by claiming that mainstream publics, a public that
comes “into being only in relation to texts and their circulation,” was
central in forming the primary norms of discursive space.78 These
mainstream publics, according to Warner, are often opposed by
counterpublics, which are publics that maintain awareness that they
are subordinate to dominant publics.79 Thus, counterpublics organize
themselves against a dominant “cultural horizon” in ways that not only
extend to different ideas or policy outcomes, but also to “the speech
genres and modes of address that constitute the public or the
hierarchy among the medium.”80 For Marc, these counterpublics were
vital to prompting Kulturkampf because such counterpublics provided
a “horizon of opinion and exchange” which remained “distinct from
authority, and could create alternative group identity that could
challenge the status of the mainstream discursive public.”81 Second,
these counterpublics served as important markers of community for
the marginalized community and thus could reinforce the newly
empowered social identity.82
The relationship between the mechanisms of place and space and
their relationship to Kulturkampf has several consequences for property
theory. First, Marc’s focus on the mechanisms of place, space, and to
a lesser extent, scale, is consistent with his “thick” conception of
community insofar as Kulturkampf crises in property law emerge from
an attempt to reconcile binary property norm, as well as conflicting
cultural frames. Bearing down on place and space conflicts furthers
this project of understanding how context is a necessary element of
property theory. Second, it suggests why Kulturkampf conflicts differ,
perhaps, in their intensity. The disputes become so devastating in the
construction of social identities because such disputes are tied to the
77

The basic definition for “public sphere” was initially outlined by Jürgen
Habermas. See Jürgen Habermas, The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article, 3 NEW GER.
CRITIQUE 49 (1964).
78
WARNER, supra note 74, at 66.
79
Id. at 119.
80
Id. An example of a counterpublic is the movement of the Riot Grrls, which
not only opposed dominant norms of female identity, but also created alternative
spaces of communication such as handmade magazines (often referred to as ‘zines) to
create different mediums of communication. Catherine Driscoll, Girl Culture, Revenge
and Global Capitalism: Cybergirls, Riot Grrls, Spice Girls, 14 AUSTL. FEMINIST STUD. 173,
177–80 (1999).
81
Poirier, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 4, at 403.
82
Id.
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“very ground” of the dispute. Finally, the mechanisms of space and
place explain why property law and theory was so central to Marc’s
treatment of Kulturkampf. Property law is where law attempts to
manage how we interact with local, neighborly space, and moreover,
property law encourages on-the-ground, social institutions that can
manage social conflict.
The Poirean Perspective also addresses how Kulturkampf can occur
around property resources. The Poirean Perspective suggests that
Kulturkampf emerges out of a process where formerly marginalized
groups become “visible” in specific places and spaces. Marc noted that
“visibility is key to the process of changing informal social norms, and
thus, eventually being able to address and change legal norms.”83 Marc
claimed that increased visibility for formerly marginalized groups
occurred through what he termed “microperformances of identity.”84
Adopted from the pioneering work of Erving Goffman on presentation
of self through
microinteractions,85 Marc argued that
microperformances of identity occur when an individual undertakes
small interpersonal interactions, “everyday performances of self”
directed towards social audience.86
In engaging in these
microperformances of identity, an individual and the respective social
audience engage in mutually reinforcing behavioral cues around these
everyday performances of self.87
Visibility for formerly marginalized groups becomes possible
when such groups begin to challenge and even misappropriate these
behavioral cues. Marc contended that the “misappropriation” of these
visual cues “has the potential to shift the significance and therefore the
identity-revealing and reproducing potential of specific behaviors and
traits, and thus eventually to shift and restructure the larger system of
socially-relevant identity categories to which identity-representing and
(re) producing behaviors refer.”88 In his scholarly work, Marc traced
how microperformances of identity engaged in by the LGBT
community in New Jersey in a variety of different contexts, including
opening gay bars, ordering sexual literature, and challenging public
accommodations and employment discrimination, led to successive

83

Id. at 405.
Poirier, Microperformances of Identity, supra note 4, at 5.
85
Marc reviewed a number of works in development of the theory of the
microperformances of identity. See id. at 5 n.6.
86
Id. at 5.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 5–6.
84
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legal challenges.89 These successive legal challenges, then, served as
the primary basis for a successful challenge to ensure marital benefits
for this community.90 Kulturkampf, however, is generated in these
circumstances because while disruptive microperformances of identity
were necessary strategies for more visibility of marginalized
communities, these disruptive microperformances implicate longstanding moral and cultural norms, thus prompting a likely counterreaction.
Place and space provide a crucial forum for these
microperformances since, as Marc noted,
[A]ny gathering place—a bar or hotel or barracks—can
become a space of interactions that create, support and
reaffirm a certain kind of identity, or that, on the other hand,
suppress it. Communications in the press—a space without
a place—become another kind of field of recognition and
interaction.91
The centrality of place and space in providing forums for visibility
challenges means that property law in the Poirean Perspective, then,
becomes a crucial mediation tool for managing these fraught
interactions. Trespass becomes a vehicle to manage unwanted access
claims by marginalized groups. Public and private nuisance actions
can be brought against place/space such as African-American
churches or gay bars. Covenants become a way to manage an increase
in the presence of a marginalized community in a particular
neighborhood. These doctrines become vehicles for managing the
ways in which place and space form the Kulturkampf.
II. TRADEMARK LAW IN THE TIME OF KULTURKAMPF
This Part considers the pragmatic impact of the Poirean
Perspective by applying it to one factual scenario: the existence of
racially stigmatizing trademarks such as the Washington Redskins.
While a live controversy is before Supreme Court as to whether Section
(2)(a) of the Lanham Act of 1946 can bar such marks under the First
Amendment, this Article will consider the controversies in light of the
Poirean Perspective, as outlined infra. While the scholarly debate over
the validity of racially disparaging trademarks is an intense one,92 the
89

Poirier, Piecemeal and Wholesale Approaches Towards Marriage Equality, supra note
4, at 300–09.
90
Id. at 321–27 (discussing marital litigation in New Jersey).
91
Poirier, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 4, at 406.
92
Regan Smith, Trademark Law and Free Speech: Protection for Scandalous and
Disparaging Marks, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 451, 452 (2007) (arguing “the current
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Poirean Perspective is useful because it helps explain why the
relationships between trademarks, place, and social conflict generates
moments of Kulturkampf.
This Part first explores the existence of what Marc termed the
community brand and why such brands embody the dialogical tension
described in his scholarship. Next, this Part examines how the current
controversy over racially stigmatizing marks derives from the
relationship of community brands to the overall mechanism of
prohibition on registering scandalous trademarks largely serves no purpose and
represents a challenge to First Amendment considerations”); Mark S. Nagel & Daniel
A. Rascher, Washington “Redskins” – Disparaging Term or Valuable Tradition?: Legal and
Economic Issues Concerning Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 789, 803 (2006) (reasoning that the failure of the Washington Redskins to
change their trademark might be due to how economically valuable it is, therefore the
best recourse might be to compensate the team for a potential name change); Gavin
Clarkson, Racial Imagery and Native Americans: A First Look at the Empirical Evidence Behind
the Indian Mascot Controversy, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 393, 401 (2003)
(proposing that all racial Indian mascots be eliminated and allow tribes to trademark
their identities and license them when the tribe feels it is culturally appropriate to do
so); Rachel Clark Hughey, The Impact of Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo on Trademark
Protection of Other Marks, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 327, 365 (2003)
(“Although it is debatable whether a majority of Native Americans find the use of
Native American mascots, logos, and names offensive within the necessary definition
for trademark law, it is a fact that many Native Americans, and other non-Native
Americans, do find the uses insulting.”); Justin G. Blankenship, The Cancellation of the
Redskins as a Disparaging Trademark: Is Federal Trademark Law an Appropriate Solution for
Words that Offend?, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 415, 438 (2001) (arguing that Section 2(a) of
the Lanham Act “does not represent an unconstitutional condition” and that it is
appropriate for the government to protect minorities from disparaging trademarks);
Jack Achiezer Guggenheim, Renaming the Redskins (and the Florida State Seminoles?): The
Trademark Registration Decision and Alternative Remedies, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 287, 304–
08 (1999) (offering alternative legal remedies to pursue for trademarks that Native
Americans would consider disparaging and recommending the Washington Redskins
change their name to recapture the goodwill of Native Americans); Kristin E.
Behrendt, Cancellation of the Washington Redskins’ Federal Trademark Registrations: Should
Sports Team Names, Mascots and Logos Contain Native American Symbolism?, 10 SETON HALL
J. SPORT L. 389, 414 (2000) (“A nationwide movement to abolish racially discriminatory
team symbols will help both professional and nonprofessional sports to promote team
players, positive attitudes, team talent and athletic ability.”); Jeffrey Lefstin, Note, Does
the First Amendment Bar Cancellation of REDSKINS?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 665, 707–08 (2000)
(arguing that commercial free speech protection for the use of the Washington
Redskins trademark does not apply because an affiliatory mark has little to no
informational content); Kimberly A. Pace, The Washington Redskins Case and The Doctrine
of Disparagement: How Politically Correct Must a Trademark Be?, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 7, 12–14
(1994) (describing that Native American groups have long claimed that the
Washington Redskins’ trademark is a racial epithet and have made many legal and
non-legal attempts to alter the name of the team); Bruce C. Kelber, “Scalping the
Redskins:” Can Trademark Law Start Athletic Teams Bearing Native American Nicknames And
Images On The Road To Racial Reform?, 17 HAMLINE L. REV. 533, 536 (1994) (arguing
that Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act can provide protection for Native American
groups who are offended by disparaging marks).
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Kulturkampf. This Part concludes by analyzing how the Poirean
Perspective will yield pragmatic solutions that could resolve these
conflicts.
A. Community Brands and Kulturkampf
Trademarks, unlike patents and copyrights, are not protected
under the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States
Constitution93 since nominally trademarks do not have a creator such
as an author or inventor.94 One could potentially assign creative credit
to the designer of the mark but such creative credit does not extend to
the intangible association (“goodwill”), which associates the mark with
a source of product.95 Modern trademark law has typically assigned the
claim of creativity to the trademark owner, arguably to its detriment.
This creativity, notes Keith Aoki, typically rests upon justification that
seeks to protect the labor-effect of the trademark owner.96
A reading of the Poirean Perspective suggests that imprecision in
trademark law occurs because the law seeks a dialogical balance
between the labor-creation effort of the trademark owner and the
consuming public’s effort in giving associative meaning to the
trademark.
The Poirean Perspective is consistent with other
scholarship in this area. For instance, Stephen Wilf has emphasized
that trademark creation should be considered an act of joint
authorship between the trademark owner and the public.97 Wilf
suggests that:
Trademark creation is a two-step process. First, a producer
affixes a symbol to the product. Second, the public associates
the symbol with the product. The producer affixing a symbol
93

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93–94 (1879) (“Any attempt, however, to
identify the essential characteristics of a trade-mark with inventions and discoveries in
the arts and sciences, or with the writings of authors, will show that the effort is
surrounded with insurmountable difficulties. The ordinary trade-mark has no
necessary relation to invention or discovery. It is often the result of accident rather
than design, and when under the act of Congress it is sought to establish it by
registration, neither originality, invention, discovery, science, nor art is in any way
essential to the right conferred by that act.”).
95
Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual Property
and the Public Domain––Part II, 18 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 191, 242 (1994).
96
Id. at 242 (“Precisely because traditionally there has been no authorial, inventive
figure in trademark to justify the grant of intellectual property rights, aspects of
author––and inventor––reasoning have surreptitiously seeped into trademark law.
Traces of authorship have been ascribed to the trademark owner who has invested her
‘sweat of the brow’ to ‘create’ value in a mark, so that she is looked upon as being
legally entitled and justified in ‘reaping what she has sown.’”).
97
Steven Wilf, Who Authors Trademarks?, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 33 (1999).
94
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might be called primary meaning while secondary meaning
embodies the idea of public association. This association
takes place in the midst of a market where linguistic
exchange parallels the transfer of goods. Both the producer
and the consuming public are joint authors.98
This joint act, however, is not simply authorship in the traditional
sense. In a previous work,99 I have argued that the text which
accompanies the disclosure of a patent as an intermediated text serves
as a representative of an imagined social world from which an
invention derived.
Arguably, the trademark serves an equally representative effect,
but in a different way.
Unlike patents, trademarks have a
representative effect insofar as trademarks are representative of the
actual shared social worlds between the producer and the consuming
public.100 If we extend the Poirean Perspective to the representative
effect of trademark, we can see the constant dialogical tension between
production and association in trademark as a constant thematic
element of this area of law. This shared public creativity is at the heart
of a functional trademark law.
Typically, modern trademark law has ascribed a relatively narrow
definition to the type of shared worlds in which we see the
representative effect of trademarks applied to the shared worlds of
consumers and producers in the modern marketplace. Initially,
trademark law sought to be responsive to how different consumers
reacted to specific functions of the trademarks.101 Recently, however,
scholars have claimed individuals may have a different relationship to
the act of trademark creativity, thus shifting the trademark’s
relationship to shared worlds of cultural meaning. The shifting social
meanings of trademarks in a variety of different shared social worlds
have prompted scholars to reevaluate the functions of trademark law.
For instance, Sonia Katyal has recently referred to the intersectional
demands placed on trademark law,102 given its joint role in regulating

98

Id.
KALI MURRAY, THE POLITICS OF PATENT LAW: CRAFTING THE PARTICIPATORY PATENT
BARGAIN 22–25 (2013).
100
Charles Lemert defines a shared social world, including “everything obviously
includes everything that constitutes the collective life of groups of people, up to and
including societies—their economies, their politics, their shared mental things, their
culture, and more.” CHARLES LEMERT, SOCIAL THINGS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
SOCIOLOGICAL LIFE 118 (2d ed. 2002).
101
Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV.
813, 818 (1927).
102
See Sonia K. Katyal, Trademark Intersectionality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1601 (2010).
99
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what she terms a marketplace of goods and a marketplace of ideas.103
For Katyal, trademark’s intersectionality is key to its functional nature
as an area of legal analysis because while trademarks are “commodities
in one sense, they are also expressions in another, to both the
markholder that owns them and to the public that perceives them, and
the law inherits the responsibility of navigating a trademark’s potential
contradiction between its status as corporate property and as cultural
icon.”104
The Poirean Perspective adds to this dialogue about the
representative effect of trademarks, by exploring how trademarks and
associated brands that had particularly rich connections to cultural
conflicts over group identities such as sexual orientation and race. In
his own work, Marc advanced an understanding of trademark law and
its application to one specific set of brands, which he termed community
brands. As defined by Marc, community brands are brands that use
“[t]rademark (and other exclusion mechanisms) to serve (sometimes)
to manage the personal and community identity traits that
consumption of the brand confers on consumers.”105 The community
brand represents an intense form the dialogical function of a
trademark. The producer of the trademark has created the symbol or
set of marks (“the brand”) that is associated with a particular image of
a group identity, and the mark acquires a significant public association
with those values, since the public itself engages in the separate
identity-producing activities that reinforce the meaning of the mark.106
The consumption of the community brand is the source of the groupidentity and an independent social identity emerges from that
consumption.107
As an initial matter, Marc likely intended that the term
“community brand” be distinguishable from mainstream trademark
law, which does protect some categories of group identity. For
instance, Section 1127 of the Lanham Act permits “group-identity” to
be protected through collective marks, which are those marks used by
the “the members of a cooperative, an association, or other collective
103

Id. at 1606.
Id. at 1612.
105
Marc R. Poirier, Why the Boy Scouts Can’t Jump: Trademark, Identity,
Localism, and the Governance of an Anti-Gay Brand, Slide 51 (Feb. 12, 2014)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Seton Hall Law Review) [hereinafter Why
the Boy Scouts Can’t Jump]. I have reconstructed my discussion of community brands
from this unpublished manuscript of the speech Marc delivered at Marquette
University Law School in 2014, as well as personal discussions with Marc.
106
Id. at Slide 81.
107
Id. at Slide 83.
104
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group or organization,”108 or certification marks, which are those marks
that certify that the “work or labor on the goods or services was
performed by members of a union or other organization, or collective
marks.”109 The community brand is distinct from these protected
“group-identity” marks. A “community brand” builds a distinct
identity, whereas collective or certification marks actually protect preexisting social identities, such as a fraternity or a trade association.
Thus, the community brand builds itself through an associative bond
with its consuming public. The consumption of the community brand
is the source of the group-identity and an independent social identity
emerges from that consumption.110
Furthermore, the community brand fosters an intense bond with
the public, generally, and its members because the brand owner can
practice exclusion mechanisms that operate in tandem with the
activities of the organization that are strengthening the independent
social identity of the group. For instance, the brand owner can exclude
other types of individuals from group-reproducing activities, such as
parades, or can exclude members who do not meet the relevant social
identity of the brand.111 Marc theorized that these exclusion
mechanisms, in addition to the existence of the trademark itself,
operated to increase the intensity of the group-identity bond formed
by the community brand in three key ways. First, the community brand
becomes more than a consumer consumption decision; rather, it
“becomes a life-long, sometimes generations-long, identity and
affiliation.”112 Second, the community brand itself is often the only
alternative in the respective market.113 Finally, the community band is
a particularly powerful brand, since while an individual may want to
reject association with discriminatory elements of the community
brand, to do so would to be to reject a larger social identity.114
The Boy Scouts of America, for Marc, served as a paradigmatic
example of community brand.115 The official organization, the Boy
Scouts of America, created and managed its brand through a series of
acquired trademarks, while simultaneously its membership developed
an intense public affiliation with the brand fostered most

108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115

15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2016) (definition of “collective mark”).
Id. (definition of certification mark).
Marc Poirier, Why the Boy Scouts Can’t Jump, supra note 105, at Slide 66.
Id. at Slide 67.
Id. at Slide 81.
Id. at Slide 80.
Id. at Slide 81.
Id. at Slides 52–53.
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fundamentally through its youth education programs, as well as its
branded materials (which included uniforms, outdoor gear and brand
indicia). These branded materials worked to create an independent
social identity that emerged from that consumption.
For Marc, the independent social identity of the Boy Scouts of
America emerged primarily as a homo-social, heteronormative group
identity due to substantial changes in traditional masculinity in late
nineteenth-century United States. In Hastening the Kulturkampf,116 Marc
noted:
The issue of masculinity was at the heart of the BSA from its
founding. As explored by Jeffrey Hantover, the period from
1880 to World War I was one in which opportunities for the
development and expression of a traditional masculinity
were being limited by widespread social changes. The causes
included urbanization, the increased emphasis on the
connection between mother and son due to changes in
family size and structure (including absence of servants), the
absence of fathers from the home, the expansion of the
public high school, the increasing sedentariness and
feminization of many jobs, and the development of a new age
category of adolescence marked by dependency and
inactivity.117
In response to these societal changes, the Boy Scouts, over the
course of the twentieth century, emphasized activities, uniforms, and
social activities that fostered an ideal masculine social identity.118 The
community brand of the Boys Scouts of America, thus fostered a
crucial group-identity. Consequently, it made challenge to the
meaning of the community brand difficult as it deemed a rejection of
the social identity represented by the Boy Scouts of America.
Furthermore, no equivalent alternative program existed as
competition for the Boy Scouts of America since this affinitive group
was a “national symbol, a tradition” and consequently, had the status
of a “shared, intangible[,] cultural property.”119
Moreover, as Marc further suggested, the official organization of
the Boy Scouts engaged in other exclusionary actions as an element of
maintaining this homo-social, heteronormative group identity. For
instance, the organization prohibited gay male individuals from
serving as Scout Leaders for individual local organizations and

116
117
118
119

Poirier, Hastening the Kulturkampf, supra note 3, at 314–15.
Id. at 313.
See Poirier, Why the Boy Scouts Can’t Jump, supra note 105, at Slide 55.
Id. at Slide 80.
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furthermore, acted to exclude former members, who later revealed a
homosexual orientation.120 This exclusion served to reinforce the
harms that might emerge from a perceived pollution of the social
identity of this community brand.121
A second conclusion to be drawn as to community brands,
consistent with the Poirean Perspective, is that the intensity of the
associative bond may engender a Kulturkampf over maintaining the
social identity created through the consumption of the brand. The
mechanisms that engender Kulturkampf are more likely to be present
with regard to a community brand. Initially, community brands may
implicate the physical locations of a place or the diverse types of spaces
(place/space, aterritorial, or discursive spaces) identified within the
Poirean Perspective. Likewise, the development of alternative social
identities that engage in the shared world of the brand may engender
internal and later, external critiques of the community fostered by the
trademark owner and the dominant social identity associated with the
brand.
Again, the Boys Scouts of America offer a rich example of this
process of Kulturkampf. The Boy Scouts of America are organized in a
series of local chapters, and such chapters meet in a variety of physical
locations, including churches, schools, and local neighborhoods.
Thus, it was likely to cause significant disruption if such identity was
challenged since the social identity of the brand was strengthened by
its locational ties to particular neighborhoods and places. The process
of change after the Boy Scouts of America explicitly affirmed its antigay exclusion in the early 1990s, was, as Marc noted, “local and, most
importantly, personal.
Individual parents must confront the
implications of their membership decisions, provoking what could be
thought of as a household-by-household reflection on the antigay
exclusion.”122 The type of moral calculus that prompts Kulturkampf is
further intensified given these deeply personal, localized decisions.
Additionally, the emergence of visible alternative social identities
is facilitated by the ability of local chapters to undertake external
critiques of the social identity consumed through the community
brand. For instance, after the Boy Scouts of America’s explicit
endorsement of the anti-gay exclusion, local chapters across the
country challenged the exclusion. This local ferment led the Boy
Scouts of America to change its anti-gay policy in May 2015.123
120
121
122
123

Id. at Slide 82.
Id. at Slide 78.
Poirier, Hastening the Kulturkampf, supra note 3, at 322.
Robert Gates, National Business Meeting Remarks, BOY SCOUTS OF AM. (May 21,

MURRAY (DO NOT DELETE)

5/1/2017 1:50 PM

2017]TRADEMARK LAW IN THE TIME OF KULTURKAMPF

745

Significant internal critique by the local chapters appears to be a
crucial determination in the decision to modify the policies. As noted
by Robert Gates, the then-volunteer President of the Boy Scouts:
We cannot ignore growing internal challenges to our current
membership policy, from some councils—like the greater
New York Council, the Denver Area Council, and others—in
open defiance of the policy, to more and more councils
taking a position in their mission statements and public
documents contrary to national policy.124
The critique of the brand was fostered through access to
discursive spaces, such as mission statements. This local critique
undermined the singular message of the national brand, thus the
national brand—and resulting social identity—had to be reconstituted
in new ways.
The existing community brand offers significant lessons for both
intellectual property and property theory. The first lesson is the way
that property and intellectual property claims are intertwined in the
relationship of the community brand. An almost mystical concept in
trademark theory is how the public begins to associate the source of
the product with a specific brand. The community brand, much like
the dissolution of meaning that occurs when a mark becomes generic,
provides an opportunity to examine why individuals attached social
meaning to a signifying mark. What has become apparent through the
Poirean Perspective are the ways in which the markers of the shared
world—the physical locations or the consumed discourse of an
organization—offer us a way to see in which a brand is built and
sustains meaning. The Poirean Perspective’s emphasis on the ubiety of
brand brings a necessary element of tangibility to how we see a brand
being built over time. The second lesson offered by the Poirean
Perspective is its relationship to the disruptive origins of property law.
A key disruptive origin of property rights is a change in social status of
a formerly marginalized community. A Kulturkampf crisis in a
community brand offers us a way to think about how to effectively
approach resolution of Kulturkampf process. For instance, in the case
of the Boy Scouts of America, we can see how managing the brand itself
provided a communicative medium to think through a reformed social
identity.

2015), http://scoutingnewsroom.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/DR-GATES-RE
MARKS.pdf.
124
Id. at 12–13.
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A Kulturkampf Brand: The Washington Redskins

Contemplating a sports brand such as the Washington Redskins,
it could be said that all sports brands are nominally community brands.
Sports fandom is consistent with Marc’s claim of how community
brands are formed. As C. Christopher King notes, the shared social
worlds of sports of “pleasure and longing,” formed through “the
[community] of the crowd,” are “ubiquitous features of everyday life”
that are “uniquely meaningful and powerful” for its participants.125
Moreover, such a fan affiliation can be a social identity that
consumption of the brand conferred on consumers and their
respective communities. The primary marks of communities are
present since fan affiliation is often a long-term commitment, a
perception may exist that little or no alternative option exists, and
rejecting that social identity may be painful in the long term.
I suspect, however, that Marc would suggest that the term
community brand should be understood in a narrower manner.
Specifically, community brands are those brands that are subject to a
lack of consensus over the meaning of a particular social identity that
is attached to a particular brand. Analyzing a community brand such
as the Washington Redskins suggests the ways community brands differ
from other comparable brands that also foster affinity bonds. Indeed,
the evolution of Washington Redskins brand highlights the way it was
distinguished from other sports brands, including even those sports
brands that used Native American imagery.126
The legal and historical literature on the Washington Redskins is
extensive,127 and this Part will not review it in length; instead, it will
focus on the ways in which the Washington Redskins are consistent
125

C. Richard King, Preoccupations and Prejudices: Reflections on the Study of Sports
Imagery, 46 ANTHROPOLOGICA 29, 31–32 (2004).
126
J. Gordon Hylton, Before the Redskins Were the Redskins: The Use of Native American
Team Names in the Formative Era of American Sports, 1857–1933, 86 N.D. L. REV. 879, 902
(2010) (comparing previous use of Native American team imagery to the racialized
use of the Washington Redskins).
127
See supra note 92. See also Cameron Smith, Squeezing the Juice Out of the Washington
Redskins: Intellectual Property Rights in “Scandalous” and “Disparaging” Trademarks After
Harjo v. Pro-Football Inc., 77 WASH. L. REV. 1295, 1296–97 (2002) (arguing “that the
liberal standing requirements for opposition and cancellation proceedings, combined
with Harjo’s expansive disparagement doctrine, impermissibly conflict with the
protections afforded commercial speech and the policies underlying federal
trademark regulation”); André Douglas Pond Cummings, “Lions and Tigers and Bears,
Oh My” or “Redskins and Braves and Indians, Oh Why”: Ruminations on McBride v. Utah
State Tax Commission, Political Correctness, and the Reasonable Person, 36 CAL. W. L. REV.
11, 26–31 (1999) (arguing that when determining if a mark is offensive and
disparaging it is improper to use the reasonable person standard because it draws from
the general public and no the offended minority).
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with the Poirean Perspective’s interest in community brands. A key
marker of the community brand is its connection to a deeply
constructed, yet contested, social identity that is generated through the
consumption of a trademark and corresponding affiliative brands. Pro
Football, Inc., the current owner of the Washington Redskins, has a
number of assigned trademarks in the term and related image of a
Native American itself128 as well as a number of affiliated marks.
Moreover, this trademark ownership was accompanied by a
number of exclusionary mechanisms that fostered a contested social
identity in the brand. For example, the Redskins were early innovators
in professional football in fostering the intense affiliation experience,
including adding cheerleaders, a team band, and a fight song.129 This
affiliation, notably, intersected with explicit, racialized imagery of
Native Americans that was, even for its time, unusual.130 C. Christopher
King131 notes that George Marshall, the founder of the Redskins,
created an intense affiliative experience:
He did this in part by making game day a spectacle, bigger
than a contest between two football teams, with every
element saturated with an Indian motif. His initial logo
featured the profile of an Indian warrior, inspired by the
Indian Head nickel, which was still in circulation. He also
choose [sic] team colors, burgundy and gold, meant to
accentuate the redness of the moniker. And as noted above,
he created a band to attract a wider audience, dressing them
in feathers. Late in his tenure as owners, the Redskinettes,
attaching to its tableau the perpetuation of sexualized
stereotypes of American Indian women.132
Here, the racialized imagery of the Washington Redskins, as well
as the affiliated brand itself, worked to cement the bond between the
predominately white audience and its owner, thus evoking nostalgia
for a “glorified white order” that served as a key element of the early
social identity that generated through the Redskins brand.133
Such a creation of a social identity was deliberate, insofar as it

128

The current owner of the Washington Redskins, Pro Football Inc., is the
assignee of numerous trademarks that reference the term or image of the Redskins.
See, e.g., DREAM WORLD SERIES, Registration No. 836,112; WASHINGTON
REDSKINS, Registration No. 978,824; WASHINGTON REDSKINS, Registration No.
986,668.
129
C. RICHARD KING, REDSKINS: INSULT AND BRAND 34 (2015).
130
Id.
131
Id. at 34.
132
Id.
133
Id.
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sought to exclude groups outside of that racialized white order.134
Throughout the era of late segregation from the 1950s until 1970s, the
Redskins fostered a brand identity that explicitly appealed to white
Southerners during segregation. For instance, the Redskins were the
last team to integrate its team and only did so in response to federal
governmental pressure.135 Over time, the racialized appeal of the
Redskins became more complicated when Congress granted
Washington, D.C, democratic autonomy in the late 1970s and 1980s.136
This shift permitted the Redskins to become a symbol of unified racial
order between black and white citizens in the city.137 This racial
reconciliation was complicated by the use of the racialized image of
the Redskin itself.
Understanding the Redskins as a community brand is different
from discussing it as a trademark. The community brand, as discussed
in the Poirean Perspective, occurs where the brand’s construction of
social identity is reinforced through its relationship to specific places,
both in their physical and social characteristics. The community brand
of the Redskins is amplified through its ongoing relationship to a
specific place. Preliminarily, the social identity of the brand is fortified
through the experience of the stadium as place. As John Bale and
Christian Gaffney note, the experience of attending a game in the
physical location is a deeply sensory experience that implicates sound,
sight, smell and memory.138 Bale and Gaffney note that “the sense of
historical continuity as well as the sense of participating in history is a
powerful component of the stadium experience. The stadium can be
read as a historical text, not only in terms of the events that have
transpired there but in architectural terms as well.”139
This deeply sensory experience deepens the affinitive bond of the
consuming public to the community brand. Moreover, the stadium
operates as a place/space because of the ritualized elements of games
134

Id.
See, e.g., ANDREW O’TOOLE, FIGHT FOR OLD DC: GEORGE PRESTON MARSHALL, THE
INTEGRATION OF THE WASHINGTON REDSKINS, AND THE RISE OF A NEW NFL (2016)
(discussing the integration of the Washington Redskins); THOMAS G. SMITH,
SHOWDOWN: JFK AND THE INTEGRATION OF THE WASHINGTON REDSKINS (2011)
(discussing the integration of the Washington Redskins).
136
See generally HARRY S. JAFFE & TOM SHERWOOD, DREAM CITY: RACE, POWER AND THE
DECLINE OF WASHINGTON D.C. (20th ed. 2014) (discussing the aftermath of the grant
of “home rule” in the politics of Washington, D.C.).
137
Brett Williams, The South in the City, 16 J. POPULAR CULTURE 30, 30–41 (1982)
(discussing the role of the Redskins in common culture).
138
John Bale & Christian Gaffney, Sensing the Stadium, in SITES OF SPORTS: SPACE,
PLACE AND EXPERIENCE 25–37 (Patricia Vertinsky & John Bale eds., 2004).
139
Id. at 37.
135
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that take place in its environs, thus involving fans in another affinitive
bond.140 This socialized relationship to brand makes it difficult to
break the affinitive bond with the mark itself, and indeed, produces a
reaction that is likely to lead to a Kulturkampf conflict.
In addition, a community brand can be distinguished from a
trademark insofar as its associative meaning is subject to significant
cultural contest within a discursive space. Discursive space is
particularly relevant to the community brand since a trademark, like a
patent or copyright, is a text that circulates through a public.141
Destabilizing the shared meaning of a text itself, consequently, can
function as a particularly effective tool in a Kulturkampf conflict. For
example, in 2014, the National Congress of American Indians
produced and circulated an advertisement, entitled “Proud to Be
Indian” that sought to portray a series of Native Americans in their
everyday professional lives in an implicit critique of the racialized
image of the Redskins.142
Notably, in offering visual counter-images to the racialized image
of the Redskins, this advertisement is a particularly complex use of a
visibility strategy identified by the Poirean Perspective as the
microperformance of identity.
Marc stressed that formerly
marginalized groups acted to shift cultural and legal mores, by
performing small, interpersonal interactions that challenged the
dominant behavioral cues. The “Proud to be Indian” advertisement is
itself is a dramatized performance of a series of everyday performances
of self. We have, in the ad, a powerful performance of what Marc
referred to as visibility, an act that prompts a reevaluation of social
status. This doubling of performance embeds the moral critique of
the Redskins’s community brand because it attacks the social identity
that is represented by the brand: it fights the claim of
representativeness offered by the trademark and its associated
exclusionary mechanisms.
140

Patricia Anne Masters, Play Theory, Playing, and Culture, 2 SOC. COMPASS 856–69
(2008) (assessing different theoretical frameworks related to the claim that games
contain ritualized elements).
141
It should be pointed out that while it is not intuitive to discern the text status of
a trademark in the ways identifiable by the patent specification, 35 U.S.C. § 111 (2016),
or a work of authorship in copyright law, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2016), it is clear from its
definition in the Lanham Act that a trademark has the characteristics of a text. 15
U.S.C. § 1127 (2016) (defining a trademark as a “word, name, symbol or device or any
combination thereof”); Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA
L. REV. 621, 646 (2004) (“The trademark must take the form of a ‘tangible symbol.’”).
142
Kyle Wagner, Watch the Anti-Redskins Commercial That Will Run During the NBA
Finals, DEADSPIN (June 10, 2014), http://deadspin.com/heres-the-anti-redskinscommercial-that-will-run-during-1588597037.
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CONCLUSION
Reconstructing the Poirean Perspective’s specific meaning from
Marc’s published and unpublished writings has been a bittersweet
experience for me. However, I am confident that the lasting lessons of
the Poirean Perspective suggest that I will always be talking in some
sense to Marc as I consider the ways in which his ideas will provide me
with so many ways to think about three key ideas in property and
intellectual property theory.
First, the Poirean Perspective helps us to understand the ways in
which social identity can become a “property” thing that generates a
corresponding set of property rights. The Poirean Perspective, along
with the work of critical race theorists, such as Cheryl Harris, suggests
that we must consistently include identity in the taxonomy of property
“things” such as real property and chattels. Second, the insights of the
Poirean Perspective reinforce the relationship between the intellectual
property and intellectual property law. The community brand draws
its power from the ways in which the experience of place and space is
reinforced by the intangible qualities of the trademark. Finally, the
Poirean Perspective adds to our understanding of how social change
impacts the development of property law. The crisis of Kulturkampf is
linked intimately to the ways in which conflicts over social identity
result in corresponding shifts in the development of property law.
These three key ideas, in many respects, do not even fully capture
what I have even discussed in this Article. Perhaps, this suggests the
enduring effect of generosity of Marc’s scholarly idea; I am grateful
that you have given us so many more ideas to pursue, my friend.

